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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

No.

870053

ARDEN BRETT BULLOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

On October 18, 1989 the conviction of Appellant Arden Brett
Bullock was affirmed by a three-two decision of this Court.
Subsequently, this Court revoked Defendant's Certificate of
Probable Cause.

On October 31, 1989 the lower court granted

Defendant's Motion to reissue a Certificate of Probable Cause
and/or to stay execution of the sentence until such time as
Appellant has had the opportunity to exhaust his rehearing rights
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Defendant is aware that rehearings are rarely granted by
this Court.

This is especially true in light of the probable

lengthy discussions occurring between the justices in the
majority and in the dissent.

It is likely, therefore, that the

two justices of this Court and the one justice of the Court of
Appeals sitting by designation have firmly fixed their position
as to the arguments advanced in the dissenting opinion and
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previously by Appellant in his brief.

However, it is the fervant

hope of Defendant that this "cementing" can be temporarily broken
in order to allow Defendant the opportunity to address several
matters contained in the majority and concurring opinions which
have been overlooked or misapprehended.

Since Defendant is

facing a minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years imprisonment with
a possible life sentence because of the decision in this case it
is urged that the Court review this case as carefully as it would
a capital case.
Thus, Defendant brings this Petition for Rehearing for the
purpose of having one final opportunity to assert his belief that
his conviction was against all manifest justice and to give the
majority members of this Court a further opportunity to review
these arguments.

In addition, if Defendant is required to go

into the federal system to vindicate his conviction Defendant
wants it to be made perfectly clear that the state courts have
had opportunity to correct these problems.
There are several areas that this Petition for Rehearing
will address.

While some are relatively minor corrections of the

majority and concurring opinion others contain serious discussion
as to the analysis made in these opinions.

Because of the

brevity of this Petition Defendant has chosen not to label each
of these areas as separate subpoints but to number each area of
concern as a separate paragraph with a short introductory
sentence describing the substance of the argument.
1.

Majority Opinion Misconstrued Relief Requested.

The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Hall states, "Thus,

-2-

the relief sought on appeal is reversal of the trial court and
dismissal of the charges."

(Slip opinion, p. 1). While this

statement is correct it is not complete.

Throughout the briefing

of this case and during oral argument additional remedies were
offered by Appellant.

Appellant was aware that it may be

difficult if not impossible to ask this Court after a conviction
of this magnitude to totally release him from any further
criminal proceedings.

While he maintains that such relief is

mandated he has not requested that this be the only remedy
available.
Rather, Defendant has also sought two other possible
remedies.

First, a new hearing at the trial court level on the

issue of reliability of the evidence to determine whether the
evidence is sufficiently tainted to allow a retrial as to any
part of it.

If upon determination that a complete tainting did

not occur then a new trial could be ordered as to that portion
which is free from corruption.
Second, a hearing could be held to determine the conduct of
Defendant's attorney by allowing witnesses including the
defendant to testify as to what exactly was occurring during the
pretrial and trial of this matter.

This request is no different

than what is requested in a habeas corpus proceeding on claims of
ineffective counsel.

If it is determined that the actions of

Defendant's counsel was not done under any "strategy" but was
done merely because of ineffectiveness then this Court would have
to address the substantive arguments made rather than merely
being concerned with whether proper objections had been made at

-3-

the lower level.
The "all or nothing" relief noted in the opinion seriously
distorts the available options that this Court has under the
circumstances of this case.
2.

Factual Omission Concerning Dr. Snow's Conduct.

The

majority opinion on page 3 of the Slip Opinion notes that Dr.
Snow's interviews, with two exceptions, were not taped.

The

opinion neglects to observe, however, that not only was there no
video or audio tapes kept of these interviews but there were not
even written notes available for examination.

The majority

opinion states that the testimony concerning her interviews was
"based primarily on memory." The interviews in fact were based
entirely upon her recollections with no other type of supporting
documentation available.

The absence of even minimal notes is a

further important factor in Defendant's claim of lack of due
process.
3.

Omission of Doctrine of Fundamental Rights.

The

majority opinion ignores Defendant's claim that he was denied
fundamental constitutional rights which must be addressed by an
appellate court even though no objection was made below.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.

375 (1968).

This doctrine is

separate and apart from the "plain error" rule provided by state
law.
4.

Improper Mixing of "Plain Error" Doctrine and

Ineffectiveness of Counsel Doctrine.

The majority notes that

Defendant claimed that most of the errors raised on appeal were
properly before this Court on the basis of two separate and
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complete doctrines: (1) plain error and (2) ineffectiveness of
counsel.

(Slip Opinion, p.

the opinion, (pp.

5). However, in the remainder of

6-9) the majority opinion merges the two

doctrines together by stating that in order for plain error to be
found it is necessary to address a threshold issue as to whether
or not Defendant's counsel was ineffective.

(Slip Opinion, p.

6) .
This merger is inappropriate and incorrect.

The arguments

advanced by Defendant must be analyzed totally and distinctly as
to plain error and as to ineffectiveness of counsel.
not necessarily intertwined in every instance.

The two are

There can be

plain error with effective counsel and there can be
ineffectiveness of counsel with no plain error.
5.

The Doctrine of Plain Error Precludes Admission of the

Tainted Evidence and the Due Process Limitations Regardless of
the Conduct of Defendant's Attorney.

In State v. Eldredge,

Justice Zimmerman while stating the requirements of "plain error"
under Utah law made the following comment concerning the purpose
of the rule, "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to
permit us to avoid injustice.

No statement of the factors that

are important to our deliberations on the point should be read to
limit our power to achieve that end."
Appellant maintained throughout this appeal that the system
employed by the State of allowing social workers such as Barbara
Snow to gather evidence from the children with no recorded or
otherwise verifiable method of determining the accuracy of the
interviews and other confrontations with the children violated
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state and federal due process requirements.

This was not,

therefore, necessarily a question which defense counsel had to
raise during these proceedings.

Instead, it is a fundamental

right guaranteed to all defendants which this Court under its
supervisory powers must enforce regardless of what happens in a
lower court by judges or by attorneys.

The allowance of such a

system and such a plain violation of constitutional protections
goes well beyond any procedural niceties of a trial and any
claims that the attorneys must raise such objections.

This is a

substantive issue which should have been addressed by the
majority opinion regardless of what actions defendant's lower
court attorney took or did not take.
It is analogous to a case in which it is discovered that the
police department of a jurisdiction has no controls over the
evidence which is kept for prosecution of literally hundreds of
trials in that jurisdiction.

Once this serious irregularity

comes to the attention of this Court it is its obligation under
the plain error doctrine to correct the constitutional deficiency
regardless of whether it was raised below by a defense attorney.
These types of errors rise well above procedural problems and
strategies which the majority opinion speaks about in its
opinion.

In other words, a complete system of constitutional

deprivation was present in this case not only to this defendant
but to numerous other defendants in which individuals like
Barbara Snow are allowed to gather evidence and to testify.
Thus, under this Court's supervisory powers and its
constitutionally required adherence to federal and state

constitutional provisions the issue must be addressed regardless
of the conduct of the parties below,
6.

The Majority's Opinion Relating to Ineffective Counsel

Failed to Consider a Remand Option,

The majority opinion quite

clearly speculates as to what occurred during the lower court
proceedings.

The majority opinion states, for example, "It is

reasonable to conclude . . . ."; "he might well have thought
• . . ."; "having made this decision, counsel could reasonably
have concluded . . . ."
The statements made by the majority opinion could be
correct.

On the other hand, Defendant could speculate a number

of equally plausible reasons why his counsel did not object to
the evidence prior to trial.

Such as: Defendant's counsel was

not feeling well, he had some sort of domestic problem at home,
he was overloaded with other cases, or he was preparing to go on
a vacation to Tahiti, or he was afraid to cross examine children
at trial.

Defendant unfortunately does not know the true reasons

for his counsel's conduct and neither can this Court based upon
the present record.
While arguably in most cases an objective standard of
conduct is all that is required to overcome the claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel this case is not one in which that
standard can be applied.

For example, suppose a highway patrol

officer in Juab County stops an automobile solely because it is
being driven by a person of Hispanic discent and, after such stop
a quantity of narcotics is found.

It would be expected that any

competent trial attorney would object to the finding of such
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evidence and move to suppress it.

In fact, Defendant's trial

attorney did move to suppress in a similar situation in
Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (Utah May 17, 1989).

State v.
If no

suppression motion is made and the matter goes to trial and the
defendant is convicted the state could argue, as it has in this
case, that it was a strategy of the defense to show the hatred of
the highway patrolman against Mexicans and that the attorney
assumed that a jury may be so infuriated by this racial prejudice
that it would overlook the presence of the narcotics in the
automobile.
It is difficult if not impossible to imagine any court
upholding an objective standard of effectiveness of counsel based
upon such an argument made by the state.

Clearly, defense

counsel would have failed in his duty to protect his client by
not attempting to keep the damaging evidence out of the jury's
presence and, in most cases, eliminate a trial all together.
The same is here also.

Had Defendant's trial attorney moved

prior to the trial to suppress not only the hearsay statements of
Dr. Snow and Dr. Tyler but also the testmony of the children
themselves the lower court could at that time have determined the
merits of any claim as to the methods and constitutionality being
utilized by the police examiners and social workers.

The hearsay

statutes quoted by this Court contemplate that such a hearing
is held.

However, no such hearing was ever requested by

Defendant's counsel.
Had the court denied the motions to suppress the evidence
nothing differently would have occurred at trial than what did
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occur.

Defense counsel could still attack Dr. Snow in the same

manner which was done.
shown in

The video tapes could still have been

I he JIIVP I csl j nn niy

admitted.

! the liiildrent cuu.U h.ive benn

Absolutely nothing would have changed had the lower

court found tl: lat thd s evi dence was reliable and not tainted.
On the other hand, had the court determined that the hearsay
statements of Snow and Tyler were unreliable and that the
children be< ause u! I he '/out innnaf inn

if

iimw .'ouLd m-1

'Mildly

give reliable testimony either on video tape or at trial then the
lower court could have dismissed the charges against Defendant
without subjecting Defendant to a trial by jury

This is exactly

analogous to the car search type of case where there is
< - -

\ .

to gai 1:1 and not hi

::> 1 ose

It is not strategy; it

is incompetency of the highest level not to assert these rights
prior

to trial.
It shall also be noted that two alleged clai ms of

ineffectiveness raised tv
"strategic

-- -

-

• -,

Defendant cannot be considered
la/t the majors ty"" s spe

scenario of defense strategy is true.

Not objecting

-.t<. tne

opinion evidence of Snow and Tyler as to the truthfulness of the
children ami I 111> 1 .Ji • I n I . 11 >11"11" tun I 11ti strategic va 1 ue whatsoevei
Had objections been made this Court's decision of Rimmasch would
have given Defendant d ::-r* LJLJLCII.

Likewise, the failure to make

post-trial motions again has no strategic justification since
strategy only applies to t r i a l — n o t post-trial.
to

There is nothing

lose i n ask inq I" he tr i a3 • 201 irt t o c» irrecti cla 1 med t r ial

errors.
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Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion again speculates
that there is "no assurance that the trial court, or a majority
of this Court, would accept the proposition advanced by appellate
counsel and by Justice Stewart that the children were so tainted
by Barbara Snow's activities that they could never take they
could never take the stand." (Slip Opinion, p.
statement completely misses the point.

9)- This

Had the lower court

counsel objected to this testimony at least the issue would be
preserved for appeal and this Court could determine whether such
evidence was tainted or not.

Since defense counsel failed to

raise this issue at all Justice Zimmerman's hypothesis that the
argument of tainting would not be accepted is only speculation
since the majority opinion clearly states that no substantive
issues are being examined.

Likewise, Justice Zimmerman is

assuming that if defense counsel succeeded in excluding the
testimony of Barbara Snow and the video taping of the children
that necessarily the children still would have been allowed to
testify in court.

Again, it may well be (since we are all

speculating) that the tainting was so great that no such
testimony either video tape or live could be permitted.
Finally, having the children testify live without Barbara
Snow's hearsay testimony would have given the defendant the right
to confront the children without the damaging testimony
of Barbara Snow and may also well have resulted in a different
verdict.
It is difficult to understand in a case with such close
questions and of such importance to this man and his family how
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the majority can affirm the decision without allowing the type of
tai tual inqitiiy needed to justify Hie specula^ ••
majority decision is based.

which the

At a minimum, Defendant is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of probing with actual
factual investigation as tu I lie reliability ot the evidence and
the competency of his lower court counsel.
too serious i
6

This matter is far

he dismissed on academic and speculative grounds.

Conclusion.

It is therefore respectfully submitted

that the majority of this Court modify and amend its opinion in
o r ci e i t h af proper e v i dent i a r y hearings •: a»i b e h e .1 d b e 1 o w t" o
determine if the decision should be affirmed, dismissed, or a new
trial granted.
DATED this 4th day of November, 1989.

Craig S. $ o o k
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
1 hereby certify that I personally delivered copies of the
foregoing Appn 1 I ;w\\ '«, Petition for Rehearing to David B.
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 6th day of November, 1989.

